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1. Introduction 
In paragraph six of the paper by professor Visser (Visser, 1989) some 
remarks are made on the micro-economie foundations of financial intermedia-
tion. In recent literature one can find a substantial number of studies 
explaining the existence of financial intermediation as a result of the 
lender-borrower information asvmmetrv. Before I pay attention to these 
studies, we first have a look at some less recent literature. Next, I 
discuss the question whether a fractional banking system is stable or not 
and needs to be regulated. 
Basically one can distinguish two opposing views on this matter. The 
first school argues that there is no need to regulate either individual 
banks or a banking system as a whole. Market discipline will prevent banks 
from taking excessive risks by imposing adequate risk-premiums on bank 
liabilities. Economie agents collect all relevant information and make 
unbiased estimates of the risk they are exposed to. As a matter of fact the 
capital market is considered to be information efficiënt (cf. Fama, 1970) 
The macro problems (the so called svstematic risk) arising from a fractional 
banking system can easily be removed by separating the functions performed 
by banks. This view is advocated by e.g. Fama (1980, 1985), Wessels (1987)1 
and Kareken (1985) The second view argues that the existence of banks, even 
when they give signals of their integrity trough their capital structure or 
by their good reputation, cannot solve either the moral-hazard problem or 
the instability problem resulting from the term intermediation performed by 
commercial banks. Banks should be regulated on behalf of the depositors to 
prevent welfare losses resulting from bank failures.2 In this view banks 
perform several, collective welfare increasing, functions and these func-
tions cannot be separated without a loss to society (Guttentag and Herring 
(1986, 1987)). 
1
 The view of Wessels (1986, page 101) on prudential supervision 
reflects the "rational expectations" school. He expresses hls view as 
follows: 
"If the evidence supports the notion that prices in financial markets 
in general reflect informed and unbiased forecasts of future market 
values what rationale is there then for subjecting part of the financi-
al market to regulatory constraints? As even a superficial examination 
of the current vogue of deregulation shows, barriers between different 
segments of the financial market are very much the product of regula-
tion aimed at restricting entry and preventing competition rather than 
a lack of efficiency and competition per se. The evidence from unregu-
lated financial markets clearly documents that competition ensures that 
current prices consistently reflect current expectations, implying that 
all information available to market participants is embodied in market 
prices. Regulation in financial markets seems only to create barriers 
to efficiency rather than surmounting them." 
2
 Also bank borrowers would have to- make costs when their bank fails. 
Guttentag and Herring (1987) argue that they have invested in a long term 
relationship with their bank. If a bank happens to fail they have to carry 
the costs of a reinvestigation to their creditworthiness by a new bank. This 
view is in line with the suggestions of, for example Campbell and Kracaw 
(1980), that borrowers have to pay for the information production necessary 
to confirm the true value of their projects. 
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From a purely theoretical point of view market discipline by itself 
cannot - in my opinion - completely solve the moral hazard problems associa-
ted with banking in a world where bankers have more information than their 
creditors. But it can be argued that other forces ensure the stability of 
banks. The most important problem is how macro-economie problems resulting 
from shock-induced bank failures should be dealt with. 
2. The problems arising of the borrower/lender information asymmetrv. 
2.1 Adverse selection as a result from informational asvmmetries. 
Before I pay attention to the literature on financial intermediation, 
a few words about the effects of information asymmetry are in order. In the 
traditional neo-classical theory one of the most important assumptions 
concerning the functioning of the intertemporal capital market is that all 
relevant information on investment projects is costlessly available to all 
participants (Stigler, 1961, 1967, Hirshleifer, 1958). All new information 
is also instantaneously available to all parties involved. A few remarks on 
the relevance of this assumption must be made. 
In this perfect neo-classical world an entrepreneur (or a deficit 
household) issues IOU's to finance his (or hers) investment projects. This 
IOU is - under conditions of uncertainty - a conditional promise to pay an 
amount of money to a deficit household in a well-specified future state of 
the world. Because the deficit households have access to all the relevant 
information it is possible to create perfect risk sharing (in an Arrow/De-
breu sense) contracts because: 
The surplus units (or consumers) can observe the true (expected) value 
of the projects to be financed. The producers cannot make a profit by 
presenting "lemon" projects to the market as good - i.e. profitable-
ones. 
No potential agent-principal conflict arises. The agents cannot shift 
any agency-costs to the external investors. As a result the initial 
(expected) value of the project is not lowered because of the agency 
costs caused by a non-optimal performance of the agents. 
In this frictionless/complete information capital market, the creation 
of Pareto-optimal contingent-state contracts is possible. Al agents are able 
to perfectly diversify their portfolios and there is no need for the 
deficit-units to compensate the surplus units for project-specific risks. In 
this "Nirvana" world there is no spread between lending and borrowing rates 
and a Pareto-optimal equilibrium is achieved (cf. Hirshleifer, 1958). 
Unfortunately the real world f ar from perfect at all. Apart from 
transaction costs, from which I will abstract in this context, there is 
also a substantial cost resulting from borrower/lender information asymme-
tries.3 When information is only obtainable at a substantial cost, market 
3
 It could be argued that information costs are a special kind of 
transaction costs. Leiand and Pyle (1977, footnote 16 on page 383) make a 
clear cut distinction between these two types of costs. They explain why 
they make a distinction: 
"We do not consider information of this type to be a normal "transac-
2 
failures resulting of an adverse selection process and agency costs, may 
occur (Akerlof, 1970). The information asymmetry between potential borrowers 
and lenders opens up the possibility for producers to present bad projects 
(lemons) to the market as good ones. They can simply collect the revenues of 
the lOU's issued and run. In a one-period setting this dishonest strategy 
will result in high, but obviously not sustainable, profits. The honest 
entrepreneurs are the losers in this market. They have to dedicate the funds 
obtained to the risky projects, whose results are uncertain. Compared to the 
dishonest strategy the earnings of the honest actors are lower. 
This dishonest strategy cannot be aussumed to be accepted by the 
investors. In the next period they raise their requested expected return 
rate and because they cannot distinguish, due to the information asymmetry, 
ex-ante the quality of the project to be financed, this rate is charged to 
all projects. The high requested rate reduces the net present value of the 
projects to be financed. The good projects are crowded out of the market-
they have a negative net present value - and only the bad ones remain. The 
result of this process is a lowering of the average quality of projects 
presented to the market. At the end of the day the result of the producers' 
moral hazard is a complete breakdown of the market. No good quality project 
can get external finance at a reasonable cost. 
2.2 Capital structure as a signalling device. 
Obviously this theoretical result ±A not in line with what one observes 
in the real world. Several authors developed models to explain how in a 
world with costly information a finance equilibrium can be achieved. A major 
step to solve the problems of asymmetrical information was made by Leiand 
and Pyle (1977)4 They suggest that a producer can signal the quality of his 
projects to the market by retaining a personal equity in the project.5 His 
personal stake in a project should be just as high as the specifie risk of 
the project to be financed. This shift of specif ie risk from the external 
lenders to the entrepreneur means that the lenders do not have to take any 
specific risk; in fact they lend (as suggested by Leiand and Pyle) against 
the riskfree rate. 
On first sight this solution seems to be a good one. It does not pay 
for the entrepreneurs to "cheat" the market. But, unfortunately, this 
signalling solution is not a costless one. In this imperfect market entre-
preneurs cannot diversify away the project specific risk. Although, trough 
signalling, more projects can be financed, there is still a welfare loss due 
to the entrepreneurs' personal stakes being exposed to uncompensated 
specific risk. 
tions cost." Securities can be exchanged in many cases independently of 
how much the buyer knows about the precise nature of that security. 
Costs of exchange are considered transactions costs. We do not consider 
better information or "sorting costs" to be a cost necessary for 
exchange. Our approach can be contrasted with that of Benston [1976]. 
By emphasizing informational asymmetries, we can show not only why 
financial intermediaries exist, but also why they tend to be characte-
rized by high leverage." 
A
 No attention will be paid to the solution suggested by Ross (1977). 
In Ross model the firm's management is held personally responsible for the 
costs associated with the failure of the firm. 
5
 This personal stake is of course disclosed to the market. 
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This signalling model can be used to explain the existence of financial 
intermediaries in a world with asymmetrie information. Leiand and Pyle argue 
that firms can exist, which gather and sell information about particular 
classes of assets, because there are economies of scale. But two problems 
concerning selling information have to be solved. First, firms selling 
information cannot appropriate all the returns from the information they 
have generated. Due to so called public good character of information it can 
be resold without losing its value to the original buyers. Second, there 
should be an explicit guarantee of credibility of information sold to the 
market by the information producer. 
Leiand and Pyle suggest ways to overcome these problems. The informa-
tion generated can be captured in the information producer's assets. These 
assets can be traded, but the information contained in it cannot. The 
credibility problem can be solved trough a capital structure signal. The 
information producer proves his integrity by having a stake in his own 
firm's equity. If the firm fails, and such will happen when the firm selects 
lemon projects, the firm's organizer must take a substantial (personal) 
loss. 
This approach sheds new light on the financial intermediary's capital 
structure. Equity is not considered to be a financing device for the funding 
of assets, but serves as a credibility signal. A change in the capital 
structure, increasing equity relative to other liabilities, increases the 
market value of the firm. This conclusion is at odds with those of the 
Standard Modigliani/Miller theory. Another interesting conclusion is that 
financial intermediaries can increase social welfare. They hold large, well 
diversified, portfolios and therefore the equity stake needed to confirm 
credibility can be relatively low. So less equity is exposed to project-
specific risk and as a result social welfare is increased. 
The suggestions done by Leiand an Pyle have received much attention in 
recent literature on information economies. Some other models - based upon 
the assumption of imperfect information - were presented by Diamond (1984) 
en Draper and Hoag (1978).6 These authors modelled, although in a fundamen-
tally different way, the aspect of the intermediary's capability to reduce 
agency-costs. Also an important contribution of Campbell and Kracaw (1980) 
must not be overlooked. They quantify the amount of equity (or wealth) to be 
invested on behalf of the intermediary. They end their analysis with this, 
rather simple, equation: 
Wi 
vA - v 
vA 
> sA 
V 
Where 
Wj_: Is the wealth commitment of intermediary i, 
V^: Value of the good quality projects to be financed,7 
V : The average project quality, 
6
 For an interesting discussion of the Leiand and Pyle approach, see 
Diamond (1989). 
7
 Only two types of projects exist in this stylized model: VA-projects 
are the good ones and VB-projects the bad ones. 
SA: The entrepreneurs side-payment to the information producer. 
The wealth commitment should be higher than the side payments by the 
producers offering projects to be financed. In this case there is, even for 
notoriously dishonest information producers, no rationale for presenting 
lemons to the market. 
2.3 Is signalline an effective solution? 
Although the extension of the Leiand en Pyle model by Campbell and 
'b Kracaw can be considered a major improvement, these authors are not able to 
prove that the integrity problem is completely solved. They assume that the 
market, or, to be more specific: the investors, know the exact value of the 
underlying projects to be financed. If this is the case, it is true that it 
does not pay for the intermediary to cheat the market. But, if the market 
cannot estimate the exact value of the underlying projects to be financed, 
the possibility of a dishonest information producer still exists. Adherents 
of the efficient-market hypothesis will, of course, reject this line of 
thoughts. They argue that the financial markets are able to make correct-
unbiased - estimates of the risk exposure of financial intermediaries. But, 
in our opinion, this hypothesis cannot hold true when information is costly. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1989, page 134) emphasize that costless information 
is not only a sufficiënt but a necessary condition for markets to be 
efficiënt. If this condition is not fulfilled individual investors (deposi-
tors) must incur costs for estimating the risks of intermediaries' portfo-
lios. This solution is very inefficiënt. The costs of the reproduction of 
the information, already produced by an specialized -and therefore effi-
ciënt- information producer, are without any doubt higher than the cost 
reduction achieved by the centralization of information production. 
It should also be mentioned that these models apply to investment 
bankers (in an American sense) only. But most intermediaries perform other, 
balance sheet related, services as well. They provide liquidity to risk 
adverse consumers and deposit-related transaction and checking services. 
They also engage in term intermediation and are, as a consequence, exposed 
to an interest rate and a liquidity risk. So, depositors should also 
determine and quantify other risks they are exposed to. 
The end of the story is that the principal-agent conflict is not really 
solved, but only transformed into an intermediary/depositor conflict. 
2.4 Some other solutions 
One could suppose that, if this line of reasoning was indeed correct, 
there would not exist a stable banking system at all. As a result of moral 
hazard "wild catting" banks would fail and in the long run there would be no 
market for intermediaries. Looking at the real world, however, one can 
conclude that this supposition is not quite true. In a multi-period setting 
other forces are fostering the soundness of banks. Managers of failed banks 
lose their jobs and have difficulties in finding new employment. New issues 
of shares and subordinated debt will be impossible and depositors will 
withdraw their funds when the safety of a bank is questioned. 
One could also observe some kinds of self regulation imposed by bankers.8 
8
 Self regulation is only possible in a financial system with a limited 
number of participants. The communication and enforcement cost to achieve a 
system of self regulation are offset by the advantages of risk limitation. 
In a financial system with many institutions informal regulation is not 
5 
The aim of self regulation is usually limiting risk taking behaviour by some 
institutions that could be a threat for the more conservative institutions. 
Sometimes the govemment even authorizes self regulation and supports it by 
entry limiting regulations (Marquardt, 1987) 
Of course banks do fail, but only failures of small, mostly unit branch 
banks, are caused by fraud, embezzlement, insider loans and malfeasance 
(FDIC, 1983). The failure of a major bank is quite a rare event and not 
always caused by excessive risk taking only but also by bad, incompetent, 
management. Even recent problems, for example the third world debt crisis 
(Saunders, 1986, page 52 -54) and the 1987 stock exchange crash, did not 
fundamentally disturb the normal functioning of the financial system. 
Saunders (1986) argues that the regulators do not allow large banks to fail 
and if a large bank failure is about to happen support will be given by the 
responsible authorities. 
2.5 Are financial crises still possible? 
These observations raise the question whether there is a reason to 
believe that major financial crises, causing macro-economie disturbances, 
can occur again or not. Before I embark on discussing this question a 
remark on the definition of a financial crisis is in order. Portes en 
Eichengreen (1987, page 10) define a financial crisis in the following 
manner: 
"A financial crisis is a disturbance to financial markets, associated 
typically with falling asset prices and insolvency among debtors and 
intermediaries, which ramifies trough the financial system, disrupting 
the markets capacity to allocate capital within the economy." 
Schwartz (1982, page 11) rejects this definition, she calls such a 
crisis a pseudo-crisis. and goes one step beyond. She adheres to this 
definition: 
"A financial crisis is fuelled by fears that means of payment will not 
be obtainable at any price and, in a fractional banking system, lead to 
a scramble for high powered money. It is precipitated by actions of the 
public that suddenly squeeze the reserves of the banking system. In a 
futile attempt to restore reserves, the banks may call loans, refuse to 
roll over existing loans, or resort to selling assets. Such a sequence 
of events is to be distinguished from what happens during a disinfla-
tion of a deflation." 
These definitions do not mutually exclude each other, on the contrary, 
they both represent a different explanation of a crisis. Kindleberger 
(1985, 4) stresses the point that bankfailures can originate both on the 
asset side and on the liability side of the balance sheet. Also major shocks 
can affect both sides at the same time or in a process of rapid interaction. 
I my view either approach is consistent but do not in every occasion 
give a proper explanation. First I have a look at both views and after 
having done so I infer some preliminary conclusions. 
possible due to the high costs. 
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3. The explanations of (pseudo) financial crises. 
3.1 The asset side approach 
3.1.1 The business cvcle explanation 
In the 'sixties and 'seventies of this century several theories emerged 
trying to explain the instability (or the fragility) of a fractional reserve 
banking system as a result of the business cycle. With the benefit of 
hindsisht one might say that this theory was very much a product of its 
time. In the decades af ter World War II the economies of the Western world 
grew at stable rates. This growth was hampered by some minor recessions, but 
these recessions did not cause traumatic financial crises such as occurred 
in the 'thirties. 
In the United States a particular phenomenon occurred during these 
decades. The functioning of the financial system was halted by so called 
credit crunches. During these periods market interest rates rosé above the 
official ceilings set by regulation Q. As a result commercial banks could 
not compete for funds by bidding higher rates. Depositors could obtain 
market rates by only channelling their funds directly to corporations. They 
did so by investing in commercial paper or buying the shares of money market 
mutual funds. The real victims of the credit crunches were the small 
enterprises and the personal savers. As a rule these credit crunches 
occurred at the peak of the business cycle. 
The most important contributor to the business-cycle theory is without 
any doubt Hyman Minsky (1977).9 In Minsky's view a pseudo financial crisis 
can be explained as a result of an endogenous process within the financial 
sector. His line of reasoning is as follows. During the expansionary period 
of the businesscycle, firms tend more and more to rely on debt financing. 
There a two reasons to resort to debt instead of equity. Because current 
retained earnings are not high enough to fund all the investments to be 
made, the deficit must be financed externally by issuing debt. Debt finan-
cing also boosts profits because of the tax-deductibility of interest 
payments. Banks'^willingness to finance the debt issues is high of course. 
Profits are increasing and profit expectations are adjusted upwards. Minsky 
argues that during the upswing the reliance on debt financing increases. The 
attitude of banks and corporations shifts from what he calls hedge finance 
towards speculative finance. Firms are more and more relying on short term 
debt and use it for long term investments. The liquidity of both the 
financial and the business sector is deteriorating. Kindleberger (1978) adds 
another interesting argument to this line of reasoning. Economie growth is 
fuelled by a "cheap money" strategy of the monetary authorities that makes 
debt financing even more attractive. At the top of the cycle real output 
growth declines and inflationary pressures emerge. 
As long as the upswing continues no major problems occur. But, at the 
first signs of a recession the fairy tale comes to a dramatic end. Compa-
nies' sales plummet and profits decline. The price of a permissive strategy 
9
 An extensive survey of relevant theories of financial crises is 
presented by Wolfson (1986, part I). Because some older theories are 
outdated ot integrated in the more recent theoretical frameworks, they are 
not discussed here. 
7 
by banks has the be paid. During the downturn of the business cycle the need 
for short-term financing increases. Firms have to finance increased invento-
ries and to refinance the short term debt coming due. The demand for credit 
is therefore rather inelastic. But the attitude of banks to risk has changed 
not only because real risk increases but also because the banks become less 
willing to (re)finance the financial needs of firms. Sometimes banks also 
try to liquidate debt in order to reduce risk-exposure. 
The result of the increase in inelastic debt demand is a rise in 
interest rates. Sometimes the problems even get worse, when the monetary 
authorities tighten their policies to prevent inflationary pressures to 
continue. This restrictive policy will push interest rates upwards. When 
market interest rates break trough their regulated ceilings a so-called 
credit crunch may occur. The normal intermediation process may break down 
and firms have to resort to direct external finance, thereby excluding the 
regular intermediaries. 
Although banks and business firms might get in serious trouble, a 
credit crunch normally does not cause a real financial crisis. Bank failure 
rates do not rise substantially and runs on banks do not occur. A relaxation 
of monetary policy will result in lower interest rates and in an end of the 
crunch. 
The conclusion may be that the theories of Minsky and Kindleberger can 
explain short periods of disinflation. Although (small) - insufficiently 
diversified - individual banks or corporations may fail, no waive of 
failures spreads out trough the financial system. The reaction of the 
authorities concerned is very important. A tight monetary policy may have 
the result of amplifying a wave of failures instead of effectively dampening 
the consequences of individual failures. 
Excessive growth as an origin of problems 
Another explanation of financial crises is given by authors who explain 
a crisis as a result from excessive growth of financial institutions. Post 
War history shows several examples of the risk associated with fast growth. 
The U.K. financial system was hit as a result of the secondary banking 
crisis. The aggressive growth of a group, consisting of large number of 
relative small institutions, resulted in a weakening of their financial 
circumstances. The first oil crisis necessitated a rescue action (called 
Lifeboat) by the authorities in order to prevent a collapse of the fringe 
banks. Reveil (1975) pinpoints the bad diversification of the portfolios and 
the high direct investments of these bank as the most important causes of 
the troubles. 
Dutch history shows an interesting example of the damaging results from 
excessive growth.10 During the late 'seventies and the early 'eighties the 
"mortgage banks" grew at higer than average rates. The booming prices of 
real estate made mortgage financing seemingly attractive and riskless. The 
loans provided were partially used for current consumption and not for the 
purchase of properties. Their permissive lending policies attracted high 
risk borrowers refused by more conservative banks. The easy finance pushed 
up prices and fuelled inflationary expectations. Near the top of the boom 
the mortgage banks got involved in risky direct real estate investments, 
probably in a desperate attempt to make high profits. 
The second oil crisis and a restrictive monetary policy put an end to 
10
 Koelewijn (1987) described this episode of the Dutch banking 
history. Unfortenately his article in only available in Dutch. 
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this period of growth. Real estate prices feil precipitously and interest 
rates rosé to unprecedented high levels. The losses on real estate wiped 
out the equity of the mortgage banks and only mergers - arranged and 
supported by the Dutch central bank - could prevent actual failures. 
A few remarkable aspects of regulation should be highlighted. The Dutch 
central bank lowered the equity ratios for mortgage lending in 1977 - just 
before the boom started - from 10% to 3,33%. This change in regulation made 
mortgage lending relatively attractive for the banks involved and as a 
result prices (or expectations concerning prices) were pushed up. Only a few 
years later monetary policy, as already noted, worsened the crisis. 
3.1.3 Some conclusions 
Recent history shows that unbalanced growth can make banks more 
sensitive to macro-economie distortions. In order to prevent excessive risk 
taking the authorities should limit the risks taken by banks. This could be 
done by imposing liquidity and capital ratios, but one should not overstate 
the importance of these ratios. Attention must also be paid to the risks of 
poor diversification. Empirical evidence makes clear the risk of badly 
diversified portfolios. Belongia and Gilbert (1987) point out that failed 
agricultural banks had no different profit rates or capital ratios compared 
to the surviving banks. The most important difference they found was in 
portfolio diversification. Pantalone and Platt (1987) draw rather similar 
conclusions. Santomero and Vinso (1977) emphasize the relation between the 
volatility of earnings and the possibility of failure. Therefore regulators 
must pay attention to the aggregate portfolio risks instead of the risks of 
separate assets. 
3.2 The liabilitv side approach 
3.2.1 Some backgrounds of the svstematic risk 
Another possible reason for regulating the financial system is the so 
called svstematic risk (Friedman and Schwartz 1963/1971). Because bank 
usually lend long and borrow short they are exposed to a liquidity risk. 
ünder normal conditions their "de jure" illiquidity causes no problems. On 
the contrary, their term intermediation services are a source of profits. 
Depositors pay for these services by accepting a (compared to the risk free 
rate) lower compensation. Given the informational asymmetry between the 
bank's management and its depositors their relation is based on confidence. 
Depositors believe that their deposits (or other bank liabilities) are in 
fact riskless assets. Several authors emphasize that the term intermediation 
by banks increases social welfare. Risk averse depositors prefer a flexible 
risk sharing contract with an intermediary instead of a long term, relative-
ly risky, inflexible contract with a individual producer (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983, 1986). 
Serious problems arise when depositors believe their assets are exposed 
to a non anticipated risk. Several signals can cause a change in a deposi-
tor's risk perception. Such a signal, e.g., can be a significant deteriora-
tion in the quality of a bank's assets. In this case depositors have a 
"real" cause for concern. However, it is also possible that depositors 
perceive other events as a signal, like a line of other depositor before the 
bank. In thid case there is no real but an "information" cause for concern. 
A logic and rational response to the signals perceived is a flight in 
quality. Some depositors may simply transfer their deposits to a bank 
considered to be save. On a macro level nothing really changes, because the 
liabilities of banks are only reshuffled and total reserves are not squee-
9 
zed. Some banks might get into liquidity problems but the banking system as 
a whole is not seriously hurt by a flight in quality. As long as banks are 
able to attract funds from the interbank market or the discount window the 
equilibrium will hold. 
More serious problems arise when creditors lose confidence in all banks 
and decide to flee into currency. All banks have to deal with withdrawals 
so large that they have to sell off assets. In a financial market with 
asymmetrie information the fire sale of illiquid assets is not possible 
without incurring losses. Potential buyers of assets cannot ex-ante distin-
guish the quality of assets to be sold off and consider these assets lemons. 
Therefore they are only willing to offer a average price for these assets. 
The low prices offered for the assets on the secondary market are an 
incentive for banks to keep on to their high quality assets and to dump the 
bad ones on the market thereby reinforcing the adverse selection process 
(Lucas and Macdonald, 1987). 
Recent literature on bank runs discusses the question of the rationali-
ty of bank runs (Jacklin and Battacharya (1988), Postlewaite and Vives 
(1987)). In can be shown that a run may occur even when the soundness of a 
bank is not in doubt. A sudden event, like a failure of a large debtor, or 
an unanticipated large outflow of deposits, leading to a forced sale of 
assets below their "real" value, may induce a run. It may be rational for an 
individual depositor to run and thereby safeguard his wealth, but on an 
aggregate level running is irrational, because it triggers losses. The last 
depositors queuing up at the bank's premises have to carry the losses caused 
by the first. The best solution to solve this problem would be a collective 
decision by the depositors not to run, but the cost to reach an agreement 
would be too high. Moreover, no legal ground exist for compelling depositors 
not to withdraw. One should notice that completely informed depositors 
should also run. If they do not, they must carry the residual losses. 
3-2.2 The monetarists' viewpoint 
This view on financial crises is put forward by monetarists such as 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963/1971). In their view the deterioration of bank 
assets was not the primary cause of the banking crisis that hit the American 
banking system so badly in the 'thirties. They (Friedman and Schwartz, 
1963/1971, page 355) make this statement: 
"Whatever may have been true of the initial bank failures in the first 
banking crisis, any ex ante deterioration in the quality of loans and 
investments in the later twenties or simply the acquisition of low-
quality loans and investments in that period, even if no different in 
quality than in earlier periods, was a minor factor in the subsequent 
bank failures. As we have seen, the banking system as a whole was in a 
position to meet the demand of depositors for currency only by a 
multiple contraction of deposits, hence of assets. Under such circum-
stances any runs on banks for whatever reason became to some extent 
self-justifying, whatever the quality of assets held by banks. Banks 
had to dump their assets on the market, which inevitably forced a 
decline in the market value of those assets and hence the remaining 
assets they held. The impairment in the market value of assets held by 
banks, particulary in their bond portfolios, was the most important 
source of impairment of capital leading to bank suspensions, rather 
than the default of specific loans or specific bond issues." 
According to Friedman and Schwartz the solution for the banking crisis 
would have been an adequate monetary policy. If the Fed had provided enough 
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liquidity, to be more specific: high powered base money, to the financial 
system a spreading of liquidity problems, eventually resulting in a solvency 
crisis, would have been prevented.11 The financial crises of the 'thirties 
resulted, according to the monetarists, in a deep depression. The mistaken 
monetary policy induced a downward spiral of bank failures and monetary 
contraction. 
3.2.3 Is deposit insurance an appropriate solution? 
The traumatic events during the great depression resulted in some 
important changes in the regulation of the American financial system. In 
order to prevent bank runs a system of deposit insurance was installed in 
1933. Although this deposit insurance scheme turned out to be effective for 
a period of more than forty years, it suffers from some serious shortco-
mings. The flat premium rate is an incentive for excessive risk taking by 
the insured institutions. In the stable years af ter World War II the shift 
of risks to the insurance companies was a rather rare event. At the end of 
the 'seventies and during the 'eighties the economie climate turned more 
unstable. Increasing inflation and more volatile interest and exchange rates 
exposed banks to greater risks than ever before. The economie downturn of 
the early 'eighties affected not only the indebted third world countries but 
also the oil and agricultural sector and thereby the banks lending to these 
countries and sectors. As a result, especially in the United States, bank 
failure rates rosé to levels unprecedented since World War II. 
The recent developments in the U.S.A. put a lot of pressure upon the 
insurance system. A crucial question is whether the "traditional" considera-
tions to install an insurance scheme were correct or not. The monetarist 
view on the great depression has been criticised on several counts. White 
(1980) has investigated in detail the causes of the bank failures in the 
'thirties. His conclusions are not quite in line with the mainstream views. 
The deterioation of asset quality lowered the solvency of the banks investi-
gated. This process had already started several years before the actual 
failures. In his opinion the explanation that bank capital was wiped out 
because of fire sale asset sales cannot be sustained. Only a minor part of 
the bank failures can be explained from and unexpected withdrawals. It 
should be mentioned, however that some banks had unbalanced liability 
structures. They relied too much on interbank and federal funds and were 
more sensitive to sudden withdrawals. White also stresses the differences in 
banking structure between the U.S.A. and Canada. In the latter country 
branching and interstate banking was allowed. Therefore banks could build up 
larger and better diversified portfolios and could better resist the 
downturn in the agricultural sector. The U.S. banking system was to White's 
opinion more fragile and unstable as a consequence of regulation. 
Another important different view is proposed by Bernanke (1983). He 
offers a rather different explanation of the banking crisis. The failure of 
11
 Friedman and Schwartz (1963/1971, page 353)the make the following 
remark: 
"If detoriation of credit quality or bad banking was the trigger, which 
it to some extent may have been, the damaging bullet it discharged was 
the inability of the banking system to acquire additional high-powered 
money to meet the resulting demands of depositors for currency, without 
a multiple contraction of deposits." 
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many corporations induced a shift in the willingness of banks to accept 
risks and therefore bank managers became more reluctant to make new loan 
commitments. The deflationary process made real interest rates higher and 
these higher rates resulted in a less risk-averse attitude of current 
borrowers. The higher real rates also attracted more risky projects to be 
financed. Given the higher interest rates low risk/low return projects were 
not longer profitable. Projects with a large variance in expected results 
were not attractive for banks. Banks do not gain from the high profit of a 
successful project but have to accept a loss when a projects fails. To 
limit their risk exposure banks had to ration the quantity of credit 
committed to projects. According to Bernanke it is very well possible that 
the process of deflation made financial intermediation more risky and 
costly. 
Opinions on the causes of the great depressions hava changed considera-
bly. Kaufman (1986, page 77) makes, after having presented some extensive 
research results, the following statement: 
"U.S. history suggests that runs on individual banks or groups of 
banks only rarely spread to other banks that are not subject to 
the same conditions that started the runs, and that most bank runs 
have been contained by appropriate action, with only minimal and 
short-lived adverse effects on national financial stability and 
economie activity. Generally, the instability of individual banks 
of groups of banks has not translated into instability in the 
banking system as a whole. The major exception was the run on all 
banks in late 1932 trhough early 1933, which caused the banking 
system to grind to almost a complete halt and substantially 
reinforced the economie crisis at the time. Although an exception, 
this event was so traumatic that it has colored analysis of bank 
runs and failures ever since." 
The new insights regarding the possibilities of a breakdown of the 
banking system and the preventions and remedies against it raise the 
question whether a deposit insurance system, offering f uil coverage, is a 
proper solution or not. Deposit insurance takes away the incentives for the 
insured creditors to monitor their banks on the one hand and gives incenti-
ves for bank managers to increase the market value of their bank by shifting 
risk to an insurance fund on the other hand. This conclusion brings us to 
our last question. 
Is regulation an origin of instability? 
Another explanation of financial crisis is given by authors who explain 
a crisis from excessive growth, while assuming toO much risk, of financial 
institutions. Often the growth coincides with a regime of de- of reregulati-
on of the financial system. Although several forms of regulation exist, the 
most usual form of regulation consists of the imposition of capital and 
liquidity ratios and risk constraints for individual financial firms. In 
many countries they are excluded from making direct investments, or (in the 
U.S.A or Japan) from underwriting activities. In most countries the financi-
al and business sectors are separated to prevent an interference of risks 
(Pecchioli, 1987). In several countries the government has introduced some 
kind of deposit insurance and insurance premiums are charged. As a result 
regulation is feit to be repressive; financial firms are excluded from 
profitable opportunities. Financial regulation is mostly justified by the 
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"public interest" consideration.12 Private depositors should be protected 
against losses and a disruption of the financial system should be prevented. 
Financial regulation, however, does not only result in disadvantages 
for the regulatees. As a result of regulation the intensity of competition 
is dampened, the entry of new competitors is restricted and financial firms 
are given explicit or implicit advantages.13 The relative protection of the 
financial sector results in a freezing of competition and the existence of 
above normal profits. Also, as a result of regulation, relatively ineffi-
ciënt firms are allowed to survive because normal market forces do not 
drive out the bad performers, contrary to what would happen in unregulated 
sectors. 
Profit maximizing firms try to find loopholes in the regulatory 
framework by developing new financial instruments (Kane, 1981, 1987). In the 
U.S. banks effectively circumvented the ceilings imposed by regulation Q by 
creating NOW-accounts, the anti-branching laws were undermined by establis-
hing non-bank banks. The pressure on Congress to abolish the Glass-Steagall 
act is still growing and the act is already circumvented by commercial banks 
in several ways. Banks also try to engage in new activities, for example 
real estate financing and development, to boost their profits. On the other 
hand financial firms still try - as already explained - to exploit the 
benefits of regulation. Especially new invaders in the financial marketplace 
try to gain from the possibility to earn higher profits. 
In the long run the pressure from the regulatees on the regulators to 
reorganize the regulatory framework grows. The regulators on their side also 
feel the need to take measures. Their influence upon the regulatees is 
slipping away because the regulatees are getting more and more involved in 
unregulated activities and unregulated firms are sneaking into the financial 
sector Lithan (1988). 
Usually reregulation consists of two elements. On the one hand we can 
see the liberalisation of constrained activities. Interest ceilings are 
pased out, more facilities for underwriting activities are given and 
geographic and product restrictions are relieved. Banks (or other financial 
firms) are allowed to offer new products, like industrial and consumer loans 
and flexible rate mortgages. Especially in the early 'eighties the American 
financial system was deregulated within a very short period. The deregulati-
on of this formerly heavily regulated system is not without some negative 
consequences. In the U.S.A. the sector of thrifts and savings and loans 
associations, which due to their inflexible balance sheet structure suffered 
from the explosive rise in the interest rate levels in the early 'eighties, 
needs massive financial injections by the federal government. By diversify-
ing away in new activities these institutions took excessive risks which 
resulted in heavy losses.1A 
Allen (1987) explains this behaviour from an agent/principal point of 
12
 Stigler (1971), Posner (1971, 1974), Peltzman (1976), Holcombe and 
Holcombe (1986) contributed to the theories of regulation. 
13
 A very clear example of an implicit advantage is the underpricing of 
deposit insurance in the United States. The flat premium structure is also 
an important incentive for institutions to shift the risk to the insurance company. 
1A
 The problems concerning the SLA's problem are discussed in detail by 
Lithan (1988) en Benston (1985). Benston rejects the regulators' opinion 
that deregulation caused a lot of trouble for the SLA's. He tries to prove 
that may SLA's failed due to an excessive interest rate risk. 
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view. The institutions management tries to make extra profits by engaging in 
risky projects like risky loans and real estate. When such a project turns 
out to be a success the profits made are fully added to the institutions 
equity. A loss, however, is after subtracting from equity shifted to the 
depositors or the insurer involved. One can imagine that such a nothing to 
lose strategy is adopted when an institution is already economie insolvent. 
On the other hand, during a period of transition towards a new regula-
tory regime, some other rules are tightened. Regulators try to regain their 
influence. A well-known example is the imposition of risk-based capital 
requirements on banks in the U.S.A.. By relating the solvency ratios to the 
risk exposure of the institution the regulating authorities try to limit 
excessive risk taking. Indeed, in the long run a tightening of capital 
ratios will result in an improved quality of loan portfolios and higher 
earnings levels. But as a side effect a new problem arises. Some instituti-
ons are not able to meet the new ratios instantaneously. Some safe strate-
gies to respond to the new requirements, for example attracting new capital 
or selling off loans, will lower current shareholdings value when the market 
pays a too low price for sold off loans. Such a risk averse attitude will, 
at first instance, also lower management's earnings and possibly result in a 
loss of employment. Therefore, it is very well possible that management opts 
for a more dangerous strategy and engages in high risk activities. In this 
context Wall and Peterson (1987, page 599) warn for the dangers of imposing 
new ratios: 
"Given theoretical evidence that regulatory control over bank capital 
leads to greater risk taking, the regulatory agencies should intensify 
their supervision of those Bank Holding Companies increasing their 
equity capital due to regulatory pressures." 
One could object that market discipline would prevent management from 
shifting toward a less prudent attitude. But the informational asymmetry 
between management and shareholders/depositor hampers the functioning of the 
market. 
We therefore can conclude that the interactive process of deregulation 
and reregulation is not without major dangers. New opportunities may be an 
incentive to excessive risk-taking and the imposition of new requirements 
may, on the short run, lead to a go-for-broke strategy. 
The current system of financial regulation suffers from an internal 
contradiction. Regulation is said to be imposed to protect the depositors (a 
micro consideration) but in fact priority is given to the stabilization of 
the banking system as a whole (a macro- consideration). 
Some possible solutions 
The American experience is a clear example of the disadvantages of 
overregulation. Many detailed and rigid rules, imposed long ago, turned out 
to be counterproductive. The commercial banks and thrifts became less able 
competetive and the bill of inefficiënt regulation has to be paid by the 
taxpayers. European history show us that a more liberal regulatory system 
(allowing universal banking in several countries) does not necessarily lead 
to more failures or higher risk taking by banks. On the contrary, these 
banking systems prove to be rather stable. 
The rapid changes in the financial market place ask for a more flexible 
system of supervision. Risk related ratios create the possibility for a 
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rapid adaption by the regulators to new situations, thereby capturing new 
risks. The authorities should set themselves to measure risk on an aggregate 
level. This can be done by measuring the volatility of earnings and relating 
insurance premiums or capital rations to the riskiness measured. 
The question remains however whether insurance is a proper solution to 
maintain the safeguarding of the financial system or should be replaced by 
another instrument. My objection against an insurance system is, that - as 
experience shows us - all, even the uninsured, creditors are protected by 
it. It also takes away the incentives to maintain market discipline. My most 
important objection against an insurance scheme is that insurance is only 
viable if it is backed by the government. A depleted fund must be refunded 
by the (federal) government otherwise, in case of a major shock, the public 
will lose confidence and run.15 But, by insuring banks, the government gives 
away its discretionary competence. Offering discretionary Lender of Last 
Resort facilities would be a better solution. If the government gives no 
explicit guarantee to bail out banks, risk taking becomes less attractive. 
I do not think recent solutions against bank runs, as proposed recently 
by Calomiris, are viable ones. He (Calomiris, 1989, page 25) suggest a two-
tier deposit insurance system. On a local level insurance premiums charged 
to the institutions would depend on local failure rates. This way of rate-
setting would be an incentive for low risk banks to monitor their more risky 
neighbors more closely. On the federal level the government should support 
the system. In an integrated financial market local - geographical determi-
ned - systems cannot survive. For the same reason I also doubt whether 
private remedies like suspension of convertibility or the support by 
clearinghouses, as described by Dwyer and Gilbert (1989), can mitigate the 
adverse effects of bank runs as the seem to have done in the past. 
Several other proposals have been made to prevent bank runs. Although 
they differ on minor aspects, they have one issue in common. The two basic 
functions of bank, providing liquidity and intermediation, should be 
separated (Fama, 1980, 1985, Kareken 1985). As intermediaries banks should 
issue long term IOU's and use the revenues to buy non-marketable assets. As 
providers of liquidity they should hold a portfolio a large, long term, 
riskfree assets and transform these into small units with a fixed value. In 
the former case the IOU's are non-withdrawable risk sharing contracts, in 
the latter case the deposits are riskfree. Is this an adequate solution? 
Several authors argue that by this solution the raison d'être of banks is 
taken away (See for a survey: Goodhart, 1988, chapter 7). Banks originated 
because they were able to provide a package of services. The can offer 
liquidity services and risk sharing together. 
Another quality of fractional reserve banks is that they are able to 
make investment funds available before the savings needed are actually 
generated. Their willingness to provide finance, combined with risk taking, 
is an important source of profits ans economie growth. Their ability and 
willingness to accept risks increases social welfare. Of course banks do not 
unconditionally accept risks; they generate information before they actually 
lend out funds and continue in collecting information until the loan is 
repaid. But risks are not completely predictable or controllable. Uncertain-
15
 Guttentag and Herring (1986) developed a micro-economie framework to 
explain why bankers and their regulator systematically underestimate the 
possibility of a macro-economie shock that can destabilize the functioning 
of the banking system. Ho and Saunders (1980) explain the micro-economie 
mechanism behind a shock. 
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tv. in a Knightian sense, will always exists and there can always be a small 
possibility of a disruption of the financial system. The shocks will never 
be predicted adequately, even when all economie agents have rational 
expectations. To my mind the government has to provide the collective good 
of being a ultimate resort for the private sector. The separation of the 
functions of fractional reserve banks would be a remedy worse than the 
disease. 
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